This paper studies the effect of social learning on political outcomes in a model of informative campaign advertising. We find that communication networks among voters have important effects on parties' incentives to disclose political information, on voters' learning about candidates running for office, and on the polarization of the electoral outcome. In particular, in richer communication networks parties disclose less political information and voters are more likely to possess erroneous beliefs about the characteristics of the candidates running for office. In turn, a richer communication network among voters may lead to political polarization. These results are reinforced when interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among ideologically homogeneous individuals and parties can target political advertising.
Introduction
In modern societies a large majority of individuals rely on others in order to obtain most of their political information. Empirical evidence of the importance of political information sharing in affecting individuals' voting behavior dates back to the early 1950s when, through a series of pioneering field experiments, Columbia sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld and coauthors documented the primacy of face-to-face interaction in spreading political information and showed that this information was more likely to reach undecided voters.
1
In spite of the predominant role of the mass media in political advertising, recent empirical works show that word-of-mouth communication is still a fundamental input of the learning process of voters. For example, in an empirical study of the 1992 American presidential election campaign, Beck et al. [2] conclude that interpersonal discussions outweigh the media in affecting voting behavior. In a recent study on political disagreement within communication networks, Huckfeldt et al. [17] observe that: "Democratic electorates are composed of individually interdependent, politically interconnected decision makers. [...] they depend on one another for political information and guidance."
2 Moreover, there 1 See, e.g., Lazarsfeld et al. [20] , Berelson et al. [3] , and Katz and Lazarsfeld [19] . The work of the Columbia sociologists is the "existing evidence" to which Downs refers in the quotation. See Downs [9] pages 222 and 229. 2 Apparently, not much has changed since W. Lippmann's [22] treatise on public opinion where he states: "Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe. [26] .
In light of this evidence, understanding the relationship between interpersonal communication, individuals' voting behavior and political outcomes is of considerable interest.
However, very little theoretical work has been done on this topic. This paper proposes a framework in which interpersonal communication between voters is embedded in a standard model of strategic electoral competition. We show that social learning has important effects on political outcomes. In particular, the structure of communication among voters is important in determining to what extent voters obtain information about candidates running for office and on the polarization of the electoral outcome.
We explore the implications of social learning within a citizen-candidate model where the policy space is unidimensional. There are three groups of citizens: leftists and rightists (the "partisans"), and independent voters. Citizens have distance preferences over policy, independents are decisive in the election, and the identity of the median independent voter is ex-ante uncertain. There are two policy-motivated parties, representative of the left and right partisans, and their objective is to maximize the expected utility of their median member.
In the political game, parties select candidates running for office and the level of informative campaign advertising. Advertising is costly, and the information disclosed by a party perfectly reveals its candidate's policy position to a fraction of voters. 3 Voters do not observe these decisions, so that ex-ante they do not know the ideological position of the two candidates. However, voters may learn this information by directly receiving informative advertising from parties (direct exposure) as well as by talking about politics with other voters (contextual exposure). Based on the information a voter receives, he updates his beliefs about the position of the candidates and casts his vote. The candidate that wins a in particular, of on-line social networking sites (e.g., MySpace, Flickr, YouTube, Facebook), suggests that interpersonal communication is becoming a crucial aspect of political advertising. See, for example, http://politicalinsider.com/2007/05/the facebook campaign.html. 3 For evidence about the importance of political advertising in providing voters with information see, e.g., Lodge et al. [23] , and Coleman and Manna [7] . See also Zaller [37] for evidence on the effect of media content on policy preferences.
political information. Otherwise, parties select a moderate candidate with positive probability and disclose political information only when the candidate is a moderate. Focusing on the interesting case where parties select moderate candidates with positive probability, our second result shows that an increase in the level of contextual exposure decreases the political information that parties choose strategically to disclose. This equilibrium effect has striking implications on social learning: when the network of communication between voters becomes richer, it is more likely that a voter holds erroneous beliefs about the ideological position of the candidates running for office. In other words, it is more likely that a voter believes that a candidate is a moderate (extremist) when in fact he is an extremist (moderate). An immediate consequence of this is that in the presence of a richer communication structure it is more likely that an extremist candidate defeats a moderate candidate.
Finally, we show that when the cost of advertising is sufficiently low, an increase in the level of interpersonal communication between voters also increases the probability that parties select extremist candidates. Overall, in the presence of richer communication networks the (ex-ante) expected probability that an extreme policy is implemented increases.
The second part of the paper extends our benchmark model to incorporate for the empirically relevant case in which i) parties can target political advertising to ideologically similar voters, and ii) interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among ideologically similar individuals. 5 The latter assumption is a very simple form of the so-called "value homophily," according to the original formulation of Lazarsfeld and Merton [21] . 6 In 5 The fact that parties target their political advertising to specific subset of the population is well-known.
As Ken Mehlman, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, recently argued in a radio interview: Republican." See also Green and Gerber [13] for experimental results on the effectiveness of targeting. 6 The word "homophily" literally means "love of the same". The presence of homophily in social relations is a robust observation which applies very broadly. See, e.g., McPherson et al. [26] for a survey of research on homophily, and Myatt [24] for evidence on the effect of homophily on voting decisions. See also Currarini et al. [8] for a simple model in which homophily emerges as an equilibrium outcome.
our framework, absence of homophily corresponds to a situation in which the frequency of interpersonal communication between voters does not depend on their ideological similarity. In contrast, pure homophily subsumes a society in which communication links are only active within ideologically-homogeneous groups. In this sense, the level of homophily can also be interpreted as the level of segregation between different ideologically-homogeneous groups.
We show that in the extended model there exists an equilibrium in which parties choose to target only their ideologically closer subset of independent voters, both parties select a moderate candidate with positive probability, and they disclose political information only when the candidate is a moderate. An increase in the level of homophily harms social learning (i.e, voters are more likely to hold erroneous beliefs about the candidates' positions) and parties are more likely to select extremist candidates. Overall, as the structure of communication among voters entails higher level of correlation between communication links and voters' ideologies the expected probability that an extremist candidate wins the election increases. This paper builds on two different strands of theoretical literature. The first strand focuses on the effects of political advertising on electoral competition and voters' welfare, e.g.,
Coate [5] , [6] and Prat [30] , [31] . The second strand studies interpersonal communication and learning. 7 We model electoral competition and direct exposure to political information following Coate [6] , while the model of interpersonal communication follows the approach of Ellison and Fudenberg [10] , [11] , and Galeotti and Goyal [12] . To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to embed informal communication among voters in a political economy framework. Our results also relate to the existing empirical literature on polarization in US politics, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal [29] and McCarthy et al. [25] .
This literature documents an increase in polarization of the Democratic and Republican parties in the last thirty years, an increase that was not accompanied by a corresponding polarization in the preference of the electorate. Our analysis shows that changes in social context -an increase in the level of interpersonal communication and in the frequency of communication between ideologically similar voters -may be important to understand 7 For a survey of the existing literature on interpersonal communication and local learning see Goyal [15] .
these empirical findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the effect of the level of interpersonal communication on political outcomes. Section 4 extends the model to the case in which interpersonal communication is more frequent between ideologically similar individuals and parties can target political advertising. In Section 5
we conclude and suggest some avenues for future research. Hence, the identity of the median independent is ex-ante uncertain. We assume that m < 1/4 − τ /2 so that ideologies of independents are always between those of partisans.
There are two policy-motivated political parties: party L and party R. Party L(R)
consists of a representative subgroup of the left (right) partisans. A representative of each party is selected to be a candidate in an election. For simplicity, we restrict the candidates' type space to be T = {e, m}, where e ≡ m/2. Let t = (t L , t R ) ∈ T × T be a profile of types, where t L ∈ {e, m} denotes the ideology of party L's candidate, and 1 − t R denotes the ideology of party R's candidate. Henceforth, a candidate is an extremist if his type is t = e, otherwise a candidate is a moderate. Figure 1 illustrates the ideologies of voters and parties.
Voters and Parties: Preferences. Citizens have distance preferences over ideology and, in particular, a citizen with ideology i derives utility −|t − i| if a candidate of ideology t wins the election. The objective of each party is to maximize the expected utility of its median member. he is pivotal.
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Sources of Learning. A crucial element of our model is that independents are ex-ante ignorant about candidates' types and they may learn this information from two sources:
parties' informative advertising (direct exposure) and interaction with other voters (contextual exposure). Our model of social learning follows Ellison and Fudenberg [10] , [11] and it captures the basic idea that the amount of learning does not only depend on the level of contextual exposure, but it also depends on the proportion of informed voters in the population, which is determined by parties' informative advertising. This natural interplay between contextual exposure and direct exposure is both analitically simple and rich enough, and it is the most important feature of our framework. We now specify the details of these two technologies.
Direct Exposure. Each party j = {L, R}, after having selected its candidate, chooses a level x j ∈ [0, 1] of campaign advertising. Advertising is truthful and fully informative. In particular, if a party chooses x j , then a random fraction x j of independents perfectly learn party maximizing the expected utility of its median member will never select a candidate that is more extreme than its median member e. Moreover, as the uncertainty about the median voter is sufficiently small, i.e., m is sufficiently small, it is possible to show that a party will never select a candidate with ideology lying in the interior of the interval [e, m]. 9 For evidence about the fact that partisans tend to be little affected by campaigns, see, e.g., Zaller [36] , and Huckfeldt et al. [17] .
party j candidate's position. The cost of informing x j voters is C(x j ) = αx j , where α is a positive constant measuring the efficiency of the advertising technology. Section 3.2 discusses the robustness of our results with respect to different specification of the cost function.
Contextual Exposure. In addition to direct exposure, independents may learn candidates'
types by talking to other voters. In particular, each independent randomly samples a finite number k > 0 of other independents and each sampled independent reports truthfully the information obtained from parties' advertising. 10 We refer to the parameter k as to the level of contextual exposure and our main interest is to understand how political equilibrium outcomes are affected by different levels of k. As it is common in models of social learning, we take the informal communication structure, which in our case corresponds to the parameter k, as exogenously given.
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Timing of the Political Game. We study the following Bayesian Game. In the first stage, parties choose simultaneously their own candidate and, conditional on the candidate selected, a campaign advertising intensity. Independent voters do not observe these choices.
In the second stage, independents may be exposed to political information either directly or via interpersonal communication. Based on the information received, independents update their beliefs about candidates' types and cast their vote. In the spirit of the citizencandidate approach, the candidate that wins a simple majority of votes is elected and implements the policy which corresponds to his ideology. Depending on what we assume about the report of a partisan (truthful or not), this would change the specification of the posterior beliefs of independents, but it would not affect qualitatively our results. 11 To this end, Huckfeldt and Sprague [16] point out: "People often choose their associates and the content of their conversations, but each of these choices is, in turn, bounded by an environment that for many purposes must be taken as given rather than chosen." Also, Huckfeldt et al. [17] Let π L (s|t) denote the expected probability that party L wins, given a pair of candidates t and a strategy profile s. The expected payoff to party L when its candidate is t L can be written as follows,
Voting Behavior of Independent Voters. Ex-post, the information of an independent about party j's candidate can be summarized by I k,j ∈ T ∪ ∅, where I k,j = t means that the independent knows that party j's candidate is t, while I k,j = ∅ indicates that the independent did not receive any information about party j's candidate.
Let ρ j (t|I k,j , s, k) denote the belief of an independent that party j's candidate is t,
given I k,j and s. Whenever possible, ρ j (t|I k,j , s, k) is derived using Bayes' rule. Hence, ρ j (t|t, s, k) = 1, ρ j (t|t , s, k) = 0, for t = t , and
for every t ∈ T such that σ j (t) > 0 and x j (t) > 0. We also assume that equation (1) holds at zero probability events, i.e., when σ j (t ) = 0 and/or x j (t ) = 0.
13
Since each independent votes as if he is pivotal, an independent with ideology i and
approach (see Besley and Coate [4] , and Osborne and Slivinski [27] ) provides a natural rationale for the commitment assumption. 13 Note that this is a necessary condition for a Bayesian equilibrium to be a sequential equilibrium. See also Footnote 15 for a discussion of the role of this condition in the characterization of equilibria.
is the identity of the indifferent independent voter with information set (I k,L , I k,R ). The
Given (t L , t R ) and s, party L's candidate gets at least half of the independents' votes if and
Therefore,
Political Equilibrium. A political equilibrium consists of (i) parties' strategies, 
Characterization of Political Equilibrium
Our first result shows that there exists a unique symmetric political equilibirum. When the advertising technology is sufficiently inefficient (i.e., for high α), parties only select extremist candidates and they do not advertise. Otherwise, parties randomize between selecting a moderate candidate and an extremist candidate, and they only advertise moderate candidates. The characteristics of the political equilibrium are pinned down by a simple measure of voters' misperception about the types of candidates running for office, which we define next.
For a symmetric strategy profile s, the fraction of independents who learn (directly or indirectly) that the leftist candidate is of type t is:
We define the misperception of an independent about the leftist candidate t as the probability that a (randomly selected) independent believes that the leftist candidate is of type
is the probability that an independent does not observe that the leftist candidate is of type t, and ρ(t |∅, s, k) (defined in equation (1)) is the probability that an uninformed independent places on the event that the leftist candidate is of type t . A measure of overall voters' misperception is then the ex-ante probability that a randomly selected independent misperceives the type of the candidate running for office. Formally,
In every pure strategy equilibrium the level of misperception is zero, while a mixed-strategy equilibrium always entails some positive level of misperception. Next we characterize symmetric political equilibria.
Proposition 1 A symmetric political equilibrium exists and it is unique. For every k, there exists a critical level α * (k) > 0 such that in equilibrium:
(I.) If α ≥ α * (k) parties always select an extremist candidate and they do not advertise,
i.e., σ * (e) = 1, and x * (e) = 0;
(II.) If α < α * (k) parties randomize between selecting an extremist candidate and a moderate candidate, and they only advertise moderate candidates. In particular, x * (e) = 0, and x * (m) and σ * (e) jointly solve:
To see the intuition behind this result, first consider the case of symmetric pure-strategy equilibria.
14 Note that a profile in which parties always select a moderate candidate cannot be part of equilibrium. For suppose not, then in equilibrium voters would anticipate that the two candidates are moderates and therefore parties would not find it profitable to advertise.
In this case, a party could increase its utility by selecting an extremist candidate. In fact, this would not change its expected probability of winning and, since each party prefers to implement the extreme policy, its utility would be higher.
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Next, consider the alternative scenario in which parties always select extremist candidates and they do not advertise. In this case a party could find it profitable to deviate from this strategy by selecting a moderate and informing some voters about its candidate. The benefit of such deviation is the increase in the probability of winning the election, which in turn is increasing in the proportion of voters that the party informs. Since disclosing information is costly, when the advertising technology is sufficiently inefficient (α > α * (k)), this deviation cannot be profitable. Furthermore, the lower is the level of contextual exposure, the higher is the level of advertising needed in order to make such a deviation profitable.
This implies that when voters have higher chances to learn the candidates' types from communicating with other voters, the pure strategy equilibrium exists for higher level of α, i.e., α * (k) is increasing in k.
We now consider the case of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. Clearly, in any equilibrium, parties only advertise moderate candidates. Moreover, when choosing their political strategy, parties face the following trade-off. Since they are policy motivated and they never advertise extremists, conditional on winning the election, they derive higher utility when they select an extremist candidate. However, since independents are decisive, a moderate candidate has a higher chance of winning the election relatively to an extremist, and this advantage is higher the lower is voters' misperception. Indeed, in a symmetric mixed-strategy profile s, the difference between the expected probabilities of winning of, say, party L when choosing a moderate rather than an extremist candidate iŝ
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium each party must be indifferent between selecting a moderate candidate and an extremist candidate, which requires that condition (3) holds.
Furthermore, the equilibrium level of x * (m) must equate marginal returns of advertising a moderate with marginal costs. This is summarized by condition (2), where the right hand side represents the marginal cost α. The left hand side of (2) represents the marginal returns of advertising, which consist of the marginal decrease in the fraction of uninformed voters, weighted by their belief of facing an extremist candidate and by the increase in utility in case of electoral victory.
The Equilibrium Effect of Contextual Exposure
We now explore the equilibrium relation between the level of interpersonal communication,
voters' misperception and policy polarization. In order to do so, we compare the political equilibrium when the level of contextual exposure is k with the political equilibrium when independents communicate with k + 1 other voters. We focus on the case α < α * (k) described in part (II) of Proposition 1 since this is the only non trivial situation.
As a measure of policy polarization we define the ex-ante expected probability that in equilibrium an extremist candidate is elected. This is denoted by Π(s * ) and it is equal to:
where the first term of the right hand side of (4) is the probability that two extremist candidates compete in the election, while the last term is the probability that an extremist candidate wins against a moderate candidate.
The next proposition summarizes the results.
(I.) If k increases then the equilibrium advertising of moderate candidates decreases, voters' misperception increases and the probability that an extreme candidate wins against a moderate candidate increase;
creases then parties select extreme candidates with higher probability and polarization increases. Intuitively, the substitution effect dominates the complementarity effect when informative advertising is high to begin with. Recall that from the parties' viewpoint selecting a moderate candidate is worthwhile only if voters' misperception is sufficiently low, which requires a high enough level of advertising. That is, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the level of informative advertising must always be bounded below, and we can show that at this lower bound the substitution effect always dominates the complementarity effect.
Therefore, an increase in k reduces the level of informative advertising. 16 Since parties advertise less their moderate candidates, the cost of selecting a moderate decreases, which implies that the benefit of selecting a moderate instead of an extremist candidate must also decrease. This occurs only if voters' misperception increases and, as a consequence, the difference between the probabilities of winning when the candidate is a moderate rather than an extremist decreases.
The first part of Proposition 2 is silent about how an increase in the level of contextual exposure affects the probability that parties select extremist candidates and, therefore, how it affects the level of polarization. Note that, even if a larger value of k may increase polarization because the probability that an extremist defeats a moderate increases, if parties react to the presence of richer networks of communication by selecting moderate candidates more often, overall the level of polarization may still decrease. The extent to which parties adjust their equilibrium selection strategy to a change in the level of contextual exposure crucially depends on the change in the total fraction of informed voters in response to an increase in k. As we illustrate now, this latter equilibrium response depends solely on whether the marginal cost of total exposure is decreasing or increasing in the level of contextual exposure.
We can write the total advertising cost of reaching a fraction y(x(m), k) of independents
k+1 takes into account both direct and indirect exposure. Hence, the marginal cost of total exposure is
While in recent years we observed an increase in both interpersonal communication and in total campaign spending, only a fraction of this spending is devoted to informative advertising, which is the form of political advertising we are focusing on. In fact, part of the increase in campaign advertising is accounted for by an increased use of negative political advertising, see, e.g., Sabato [33] . In his recent survey on political advertising, Prat [32] states: "often ads convey verifiable information on the political record of the candidate [...] it is also true that some commercials are extremely expensive but appear to contain little new information." See Gerber et al. [14] for mixed evidence on the effectiveness of media advertising, and in particular Ansolabehere and Iyengar [1] for experimental evidence supporting the claim that political advertising is effective even when it is not directly informative.
Using the expression above, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition (2) as
When α is sufficiently low, parties advertise with relatively high intensity and therefore y(x(m), k) is large. In this case, an increase in k increases the marginal cost of total exposure, ceteris paribus. Formally, we have that:
, which is strictly positive for sufficiently high y(x(m), k). Intuitively, when many voters are already informed, a marginal increase in informative advertising will only have a relatively small effect on the total fraction of informed voters, i.e., the marginal cost of total exposure is very high. This implies that, when α is sufficiently low, not only the levels of informative advertising and of contextual exposure are substitutes, but also total exposure and contextual exposure are substitutes. Hence, for low values of α, an increase in k decreases the equilibrium level of informative advertising insomuch that the total fraction of informed voters decreases as well. This unambiguously softens political competition and therefore parties select extremists more often. Overall, polarization increases.
We conclude this section with two observations. First, the second part of Proposition 2 does not hold for sufficiently inefficient advertising technology, i.e., α ∈ (α(k), α * (k)]. In line with the intuition above, for sufficiently high α, an increase in the level of contextual exposure leads parties to decrease the level of informative advertising only slightly, so that the total fraction of informed voters increases. As a result, parties select moderate candidates more often and overall the level of polarization decreases.
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Second, the effect of an increase in the level of interpersonal communication on the endogenous variables is rather different from the effect of a decrease in the marginal costs 17 As an example, suppose that m = 0.1 and α = 0.1. For k = 1, in equilibrium parties select extremist candidates with probability σ * = 0.8, the level of voters' misperception is Ψ * = 0.3, and the level of polarization is Π * = 0.76. In contrast, when k = 2 in equilibrium parties select extremist candidates with probability σ * = 0.48, the level of voters' misperception is Ψ * = 0.43, and the level of polarization is
of advertising α (i.e., direct exposure becomes less expensive). The reason is that a decrease in the marginal costs of direct exposure unambiguously leads parties to increase the level of informative advertising. This is exactly the opposite effect of an increase in the level of contextual exposure. Since parties advertise more their moderate candidates, it immediately follows that voters' misperception decreases, the proportion of informed voters increases, moderate candidates are selected with higher probability, and therefore the level of polarization decreases. 
Discussion
We now discuss the robustness of the results presented in Proposition 2. We first focus on our assumption of linear advertising cost. Next, we provide a simple purification argument for the mixed equilibrium. This shows that our results in Proposition 2 are not driven by the mixed strategy nature of the equilibrium. Finally, we elaborate on different possible assumptions regarding the technology of interpersonal communication.
Cost of Advertising. We start by noticing that the results in part (I) of Proposition (2) do not depend on the specific functional form of the cost function. Consider a general cost function C(α, x), which is increasing and convex in α and x, respectively. The equilibrium condition (2) can be rewritten as:
.
Following the same line of reasoning developed in the previous section, we can conclude that the marginal return of advertising is decreasing in the level of contextual exposure. Hence, the level of informative advertising is also decreasing in k. For a general cost function C(α, x), the equilibrium condition 3 reads as follows:
, 18 The formal proof of the comparative static result with respect to α is straightforward and therefore omitted.
and since x * (m) decreases in k, it follows that C(α, x * (m)) is also decreasing. Thus, the equilibrium level of voters' misperception is higher when voters belong to richer communication networks.
In contrast, the results in part (II) of Proposition 2 depend on the specific formulation of the cost function. To see why this is the case, recall that the level of polarization increases with the richness of voters' communication network whenever total exposure and contextual exposure are substitutes. This requires that, in equilibrium, the marginal cost of total exposure is increasing in k. This relation holds more generally than for the linear cost function case, which we have considered before. For example, it holds for the family of cost functions C(α, x) = αx β , where β ≥ 1. However, it does not hold for all increasing and convex cost functions. For example, it does not hold for the cost function
, which is the one used by Coate [6] . Indeed, in this case the marginal cost of total exposure is
, which is decreasing in k. Hence, even if it is still true that an increase in the level of contextual exposure decreases the amount of information that parties strategically choose to disclose, the total fraction of informed voters always increases in k. Consequently, the higher is the level of contextual exposure, the stronger is political competition between parties and therefore parties select moderate candidates more often. Overall, the level of polarization decreases. Table 1 A Simple Purification Argument. We can purify the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium described in part (II) of Proposition 1 in the following way. Suppose that each party can be either a "high-cost" type, with probability σ, or a "low-cost" type with probability 1 − σ. A "high-cost" party has a high marginal cost of advertising, say α H , while the marginal cost of a "low-cost" party is α << α H . Each party observes its own type, but it does not observe the type of its opponent. If the difference between α H and α is sufficiently large, in equilibrium the high cost party selects an extremist candidate and does not advertise, while the low cost party always selects a moderate and advertises with intensity x * , which is the solution to equation (2) .
Using the same intuition developed in the previous section, it can be shown that for 
Homophily and Targeted Political Advertising
So far, we assumed that voters learn from sampling randomly other voters. However, a wellknown documented fact is that interpersonal communication occurs more frequently among similar individuals. 19 One possible way to think about homophily in a political context is that individuals with similar political ideology will have higher chances to interact and learn from each other. In our model, this phenomenon would entail a higher probability of interpersonal communication between voters with closer political ideologies. Note that if parties cannot target political advertising, our results will be unaffected by any form of such correlation. However, if parties are able to target advertising to ideologically similar voters, homophily will affect electoral competition and political outcomes. In this section we modify our benchmark model in order to capture these additional features in a simple and parsimonious way.
First, we define group l as the group of independents in the interval [µ−τ, µ]; analogously we call group r the remaining group of independents. Each independent samples k other voters. For each draw, a group-l member samples a voter in his own group with probability β, while with the remaining probability he samples a group-r voter. We assume that β ∈ [1/2, 1), and we interpret this parameter as the level of homophily in the society. Absence of homophily corresponds to β = 1/2. When instead β = 1, voters only communicate with 19 See, McPherson et al. [26] and references in Footnote 6.
members of their own group, which exemplifies a society in which ideology-based groups are totally segregated. Since the focus of this section is to study the effect of homophily on political outcomes, we set k = 1, hereafter.
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Second, we assume that a party can choose either to advertise its candidate at a cost α > 0 or not to advertise, and that advertising is targeted to the ideologically closer group of independents so that if the left party chooses to advertise its candidate, then all members of group l learn perfectly the type of the leftist candidate. 21 This is a simplfied version of a more general model where a party chooses whether to target advertising to one of the two groups (at a cost α), or to disclose political information to both groups (for example at a cost 2α). In Appendix B (Proposition 5) we show that the equilibria we characterize by assuming that advertising is targeted to the closer group of independents (see Proposition 3 below) are indeed equilibria in the more general model where parties can choose where to target advertising.
In this context, we can define voters' misperception as follows. Consider a strategy profile in which party L selects an extremist candidate with probability σ(e) and advertises only a moderate candidate. Clearly, in equilibirum, all group-l voters are informed about the position of the leftist candidate. However, the probability that a voter in group r believes that the leftist candidate is an extremist (resp. moderate) when in fact he is a moderate (resp. extremist) is βσ(e) (resp. β[1 − σ(e)]). Hence the level of voters' misperception is simply Ψ(s, β) = β. The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 A symmetric political equilibrium always exists and it is unique. For every β, there exists α(β) <ᾱ such that in equilibrium:
(I.) For all α >ᾱ parties select extremist candidates and they do not advertise; (II.) For all α ∈ (0, max[0, α(β)]), parties select moderates and they advertise; 20 We assume that k = 1 merely for expositional reasons; all the results hold for arbitrary finite k. 21 Here, we assume that advertising is discrete, i.e., a party can decide whether or not to advertise but not how much to advertise. This assumption is only needed for tractability. The fact that when a party advertises its candidate then all idelogically close independents observe perfectly the candidate's ideology is not crucial for our results. Moreover, note that, abusing notation, we are denoting by α the total cost of advertising, while in the benchmark model α was the marginal cost of advertising. (III.) For all α ∈ (max[0, α(β)],ᾱ) parties select extremist candidates with probability
and they advertise when they select a moderate. . Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the equilibrium in the (α, σ(e)) parameter space. The intuitions behind part (I) and part (III) of Proposition 3 are analogous to the intuitions behind Proposition 1. When the level of homophily is sufficiently high these are the only equilibria. However, when the level of homophily and the cost of advertising are low, a party cannot be indifferent between selecting the two candidates. Indeed, a low value of β implies that information often travels across groups and therefore voters' misperception is low. In this case, a party has much higher chances of winning the election when selecting a moderate rather than an extremist. Similarly, when α is low, the cost of selecting a moderate candidate is also low. Hence, in equilibrium parties always select moderate candidates and they advertise. 22 Our final result shows how the level of homophily affects political outcomes. 
Proposition 4 Suppose α ∈ (max[0, α(β)],ᾱ). If β increases then parties select extremist
candidates with (strictly) higher probability, voters' misperception increases and the policy outcome is more polarized. Figure 3 illustrates the comparative statics with respect to β. The intuition behind Proposition 4 is simple. Since parties target political information to distinct groups, an increase in homophily leads to a lower probability that a voter will possess information about both candidates. Hence, the level of voters' misperception increases, which softens political competition between parties. As a consequence, policy-motivated parties exploit an increase in voters' misperception by selecting extremist candidates more often. Overall, the level of polarization increases with the level of homophily.
23 23 In the context of the mixed-strategy equilibrium described in Proposition 3, we can compute the exante equilibrium probability that a randomly selected group-l(r) independent votes for the Left(Right)
party. This probability is increasing in β, meaning that the higher is the level of homophily, the higher is the correlation between vote choice and ideology. This result is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that receiving information about the ideologically closer candidate reduces the probability that voters switch their votes from their initial disposition. See Velazquez Nunez [35] and Pattie and Johnston [28] .
Conclusion
The Proof Proposition 1.
First
Step: Symmetric Pure Strategy Equilibria. We first consider pure-strategy equilibria. Let s * = (s * L , s * R ) be part of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. Then s * j prescribes to select candidate t * ∈ T with probability 1, and to advertise with intensity x * (t * ), for all j ∈ {L, R}. Note that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, it has to be that Consider the case of t * = m, and let party L deviate by selecting t L = e; in this case the best advertising strategy is x L (e) = 0, and denoting this strategy bys L , we have that
, which contradicts our hypothesis that s * is an equilibrium.
Consider now the case of t * = e, and let party L deviate by selecting t L = m and x L (m); denote this strategy bys L . Observe that such deviation is profitable only if x L (m) = 0.
Thus, assume that x L (m) > 0. We now derive the optimal advertising level given s * R , which we denote by x * L (m). To do this, we start by observing that:
and it is readily seen that µ *
which is concave in x L (m). Hence, the optimal x * L (m) ∈ (0, 1) solves
Note that 
, where abusing notations L prescribes to advertise a moderate candidate with intensity x * L (m). The latter inequality is satisfied if and only if
Defining p = 1 − x and substituting (6) into (7), we have that
where p is the unique solution to
, and α * (k) < (2 − 3m)(k + 1)/16 for all p ∈ (0, 1). Putting together these observations it follows that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if α > α * (k), and in a purestrategy equilibrium parties always select extreme candidates and they never advertise.
Second
Step: Symmetric Mixed Strategy Equilibria. We now consider symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. For convenience we use the notation σ ≡ σ (e). Assume that a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and let s * j = (σ * , x * (t)), j ∈ {L, R}, denote the equilibrium strategy profile. Note that in equilibrium x * (e) = 0. Consider a profile s = (s L , s R ) with x j (e) = 0, j ∈ {L, R}; under this profile we have that:
and
Moreover,
and U L (s|m) is concave in x L (m). Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium,
and only if:
where
Next, in a symmetric mixed-strategy political equilibrium each party is indifferent between selecting a moderate candidate and selecting an extremist candidate, i.e., U L (s * |e) = U L (s * |m). Since in a symmetric equilibrium we have that
it follows that U L (s * |e) = U L (s * |m) if and only if:
Note that condition (10) is equivalent to condition (3) stated in Proposition 1.
We now show existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. We first investigate the equilibrium condition (9). Define
, and note that the equilibrium condition (9) holds if and only if (σ, p) are such that f (σ, p) = 16α. The following properties of f (·, ·) will prove useful for the proof.
Property 1: f (0, p) = 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1);
, which is increasing in p;
Property 3:
Properties 1, 2, and 3 imply that σ(p) : f (σ, p) = 16α is a well defined function of p for all p ∈ [p, 1], where p solves f (1, p) = 16α, i.e.,
Note that p ∈ (0, 1) if and only if α < (2 − 3m)(k + 1)/16.
We now study how σ(p) behaves in p ∈ [p, 1]. The following properties of σ(·) are useful:
Property 5: σ(1) ∈ (0, 1) solves
Property 6: ∂f (p, σ)/∂p may change sign only once, and
Note that Property 6 follows from Property 4 and inspection of
Using the implicit function theorem and invoking properties 1-6, we can summarize the results in the following claim:
for all p ∈ (p, 1) and there exists a v ∈ (p, 1] such that
, where p is the solution to (11) . If α > (2 − 3m)(k + 1)/16 an equilibrium in mixed strategies does not exist.
We now consider the indifference equilibrium condition. Here, note that the equilibrium condition (10) can be rewritten as follows:
Furthermore,
Case I. Assume that 2 − 7m − 16α > 0, which is equivalent to α < (2 − 7m)/16.
Given this, we have thatσ(0) = 0,σ(1) = ∞. Moreover, 
Since the LHS is increasing in k, it is sufficient to show that:
which is equivalent to
Note that:
and such thatσ(p) = 1, which is given bȳ
We summarize these observations in the following claim:
Claim 2. For all α < (2 − 7m)/16 the following holds:
increasing for all p ∈ [0, 1], andp is the solution to (14) .
Combining Claim 1 and Claim 2 it follows that for all α < (2−7m)/16 a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if and only ifp > p, which holds if and only if α < α * (k), where α * (k)
is defined as in (8) . Since α * (k) > (2 − 7m)/16 and by assumption α < (2 − 7m)/16, we conclude that for all α < (2 − 7m)/16 a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists.
Case II. Assume that 2 − 7m − 16α < 0, which is equivalent to α ≥ (2 − 7m)/16.
Note that for all p ∈ (0,p), (12) implies thatσ(p) < 0. Hence, a necessary condition for an equilibrium is that p ∈ [p, 1).
Let p ∈ [p, 1); note that for all p ∈ [p, 1), the following holdsσ(p) > 0,σ(p) = ∞ and σ(1) = ∞. Furthermore, there exists a p = z such thatσ(z) = 1 if and only if
Moreover, ψ(p, α) =p k+1 > 0, ψ(1, α) > 0, and
where ψ(z, α) is convex in z. Recall from equation (11) that p is such that
for all p ∈ (p, 1). Hence, for existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies it must be the case thatp < p.
Suppose thatp < p. Then, ψ(z, α) is minimized when z = p, and a necessary condition for existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is thatσ(p) < 1 for some p, which requires that
which is true if and only if
Moreover,p < p if and only if 1 −
2−7m 16α
< p, which is always true when α ≤
then the following holds: there
Combining Claim 1 and Claim 3 it follows that if α ∈ ((2 − 7m)/16, α * (k)) a mixedstrategy equilibrium exists. Finally, combining Case 1 together with Case 2 it follows that a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if α < α * (k).
Final
Step: Uniqueness. If α > α * (k) we know that the equilibrium is in pure strategies and it is unique. So, let α < α * (k). In this case the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and recall that at the equilibrium s * = (σ * , p * ), conditions (9) and (10) are mutually satisfied. To prove that there exists a unique equilibrium it is sufficient to prove that at p * the following is true: (i)
We now show that these two conditions hold.
We first show that
Note that, using expression (13), it follows that
At the equilibrium s * condition (10) holds, which implies that
and substituting this expression in the equilibrium condition (9), we obtain that in equi-
Thus, we can rewrite inequality (15) as follows:
which is satisfied if and only if
To show that the last inequality holds, we observe that
where the first inequality follows from p * > p, the second inequality follows from σ * ∈ (0, 1), and the last equality follows from the definition of p. Hence, it is sufficient to show that C(p) > 0. Using the expression for p we obtain
which holds because
where the first inequality follows from σ * < 1, and the last inequality follows from α <
We now show that
To see this note that, using expression (16), the equilibrium condition (9) can be rewritten as follows:
and to establish that ∂σ(p) ∂p | p * < 0 it is sufficient to show that the LHS is increasing in p * . Since (k + 1)p * k is obviously increasing in p * , we need to show that
is increasing in p * , which, taking the derivative with respect to p, holds if and only if
Using (17) we have that
Combining these observations, it follows that there exists a unique equilibrium.
To complete the proof of Proposition 1 we show that α * (k) is increasing in k. Note that
where dp dk
Using this last expression, and developing
, we have that
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let
and C(σ(p)) = 2 − 4m + σ(p)m. With some abuse of notation we shall write A instead of A(p, α), and similarly for B and C. Recall that in equilibrium:
We first prove the first part of the proposition, i.e.,
. To see this note that:
Clearly, ∂σ(p) ∂k < 0, and therefore to show that ∂f (σ(p),p) ∂k < 0 it is sufficient to note that (1 − p k+1 + (k + 1) ln(p)) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1). Recall that, in equilibrium,
Combining these two observations it follows that for all α < α * (k), an increase in k increases p, i.e., x * k+1 < x * k . By investigation of equilibrium condition 3, it is immediate to see that if
We now prove the second part of the proposition, i.e., for sufficiently low α, if k increases then σ increases and polarization increases. First, note that:
Using these expressions and noting that as α → 0 then p → 0, and A, B, and C are bounded, it follows that:
Hence, there exists aα(k) ∈ (0, α * (k)) such that for all α ∈ (0,α(k)) an increase in k leads to an increase in σ.
We finally show that for sufficiently small α,
is increasing in k. Note that for small α, σ * < 1/2 and therefore Π(s * , k) is increasing in σ,
keeping constant π(s * |e, m). Since an increase in k leads to an increase in π(s * |e, m), the result follows. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Appendix B. This appendix contains the proofs of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
Furthermore, we provide an additional result in which we show that the equilibria described in Proposition 3 are also equilibria of a more general model in which parties can target political advertising to different groups of voters. This result is contained in Proposition 5
below.
In what follows, with some abuse of notation, we shall denote by i j,in the indifferent group-j voter that has sampled only voters belonging to group j, j = l, r; analogously, i j,out is the indifferent group-j voter that has sampled at least one voter in group j , where j, j = l, r and j = j .
Proof of Proposition 3. We start by considering symmetric pure strategy equilibria.
Note that in equilibrium a party never advertises an extremist candidate. Also note that a (pure) strategy profile in which each party selects a moderate and does not advertise cannot be part of equilibrium; for otherwise, a party, by switching to an extremist candidate, would win the election with the same probability and would obtain a higher expected payoff, which contradicts optimality. We are then left with two possible candidates: (1.) parties select extremist candidates and do not advertise and (2.) parties select moderates and do advertise. We now analyze these two possibilities.
(1.) Consider a strategy profile s * such that σ = 1 and x = 0. In this case the utility of
It is easy to check that the best deviation of party L is to select a moderate and to advertise. Let s L be such strategy profile. The utility of party
We now derive π L (s L , s * R |m, e). First, all group-l voters observe that t L = m, and, regardless of the realization of the sampling, they believe that t R = e. Therefore, i l,in = i l,out = 1/2+m/4. Second, all group-r voters believe that t R = e, a fraction β always samples groupr voters so that they believe that t L = e, while the remaining group-r voters have sampled at least one voter in group l and therefore they know that t L = m. Thus, i r,in = 1/2, while i r,out = 1/2 + m/4 = i l,in . Putting together these facts it follows that for all µ > i l,in = i r,out party L never wins, and that for all µ ≤ i l,in party L wins with probability 1. Hence,
(2.) Next, consider a strategy profile s * such that σ = 0 and x = 1. In this case
Suppose that if a group-l voter does not observe the ads from party L he believes that t L = e; analogously for group-r voters. Clearly, the best deviation of party L is to select an extremist candidate and do not advertise. Let s L be such strategy.
The utility of party L is
We now derive π L (s L , s * R |e, m). First, all group-l voters observe that party L does not advertise and therefore they believe that t L = e; also, regardless of the sampling, all groupl voters believe that t R = m. Hence, i l,in = i l,out = 1/2 − m/4. Second, all group-r voters believe that t R = m, a fraction β of group-r voters believe that t L = m, while the remaining voters believe that t L = e. Hence, i r,in = 1/2, while i r,out = 1/2 − m/4 = i l,in . Using these considerations, three facts follow. One, for all µ ≥ i r,in party L never wins; two, for all µ ≤ i r,out party L wins with probability 1. Three, for all µ ∈ [i r,out , i r,in ], total votes for party L are
and T V L > 1/2 if and only if
where it is easy to check that µ * ∈ [i r,out , i r,in ]. Combining these three facts we have that
Hence, s * is an equilibrium if and only if
It is easy to verify that α(β) <ᾱ and that α(β) ≥ 0 if and only if β ≤ (2 − 7m)/(4m).
We now turn to symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. Clearly, the only candidate is a strategy profile s * in which each party selects an extremist candidate with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) and advertises only moderates. Randomization implies that a party is indifferent between selecting an extremist and a moderate, which holds if and only if:
We now derive the expression for π L (s * |m, e). Suppose that t L = m and t R = e. First, a fraction β of group-l voters believe that t L = m and, with probability σ, that t R = e. The remaining fraction 1 − β believe that t L = m and that t R = e. Hence, i l,in = 1/2 + mσ/4, while i l,out = 1/2 + m/4. Second, all group-r voters believe that t R = e, a fraction β believe that t L = e with probability σ, and a fraction 1 − β believe that t L = m. Hence,
Given these observations there are two relevant cases to be considered: (1.) σ ≤ 
and T V L ≥ 1/2 if and only if
Clearly, µ * 2 ≤ i l,out , and µ * 2 ≥ i r,in if and only if σ ≥ β/(1 + β). Hence, for all µ ∈ [i r,in , i l,out ], if σ ≤ β/(1 + β), party L never wins, while if σ ≥ β/(1 + β), party L wins with probability Pr(µ ≤ µ * 2 ) = (5 − β(1 − σ)) /8. Finally, for all µ ≥ i l,out party L never wins. Summarizing, we have that:
Case 2. Suppose σ ≥ 1/2; then i r,in ≤ i l,in < i l,out = i r,out . Here note that for all µ ≤ i l,in party L wins with probability 1. In contrast, for all µ ≥ i l,out party L never wins.
Finally, for all µ ∈ [i l,in , i l,out ], total votes of party L are
where it is easy to check that µ *
By combining case 1 and case 2, it follows that if σ ∈ (0, β/(
Next, note that a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists only if σ ∈ [β/(1 + β), 1). Indeed, if σ < β/(1+β), then π L (s * |m, e) does not depend on σ. Therefore, the equilibrium condition (20) cannot be satisfied generically. Therefore, it must be that σ ∈ [β/(1 + β), 1), and the equilibrium condition (20) holds if and only if
Note that σ * is increasing in α and, when α =ᾱ then σ * = 1. Also if α(β) ≥ 0, we have that at α = α(β), σ * = β/(1 + β). If instead α(β) ≤ 0 then as α approaches 0, σ * converges to 1 − (2 − 7m) / (β(2 − 3m)) ≥ β/(1 + β), where the last inequality follows from the fact that α(β) ≤ 0 (i.e., β < (2 − 7m)/(4m)). This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is immediate to see that an increase in β, increases the probability that a party selects an extremist candidate. We now show that an increase in β it increases the ex-ante expected probability that an extremist candidate wins the election. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.
We now consider a model where parties choose whether to advertise to group l, to group r, to both groups, or not to advertise. Abusing notation, assume that advertising to one group costs α, while advertising to both groups costs 2α. The following proposition shows that the equilibria described in Proposition 3 are also equilibria of this model. Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the strategy s * in which parties select extremist candidates with probability one and they never advertise. From Proposition 3 we know that for all α >ᾱ the following deviation is not profitable: a party selects a moderate and advertises only to its own group. It is then sufficient to show that this is indeed the best deviation for a party. To see this, first note that if party L selects a moderate and advertises only to its own group, the probability of winning is Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + m/4). Second, suppose that party L deviates by selecting a moderate and by advertising to group r only.
It is immediate to check that in this case the probability of winning of party L will be lower than Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + m/4). Therefore, the latter deviation is at least as good as the deviation considered above. The other possible deviation is one in which party L selects a moderate and advertises to both groups. Again, it is a matter of simple algebra to check that the probability of winning under this deviation cannot be higher than Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + m/4).
However, this deviation involves higher costs of advertising.
Consider now the strategy s * in which parties select moderates and advertise to their own group. If α(β) ≤ 0 then Proposition 3 implies that this is not an equilibrium. If instead α(β) > 0, Proposition 3 implies that for all α ≤ α(β) the following deviation is not profitable: a party selects an extremist candidate and does not advertise. Moreover, if a party deviates from s * by advertising to both groups, then simple algebra delivers that the party will face the same probability of winning as in s * , and it will face an higher cost.
Hence, we only need to check the following deviation s d : party L selects a moderate and advertises only to group-r voters. However, note that s * and s d are cost equivalent, but the probability of winning of party L under s d is lower than under s * .
We now consider the mixed-strategy equilibrium defined in Proposition 3. We already know that for all α ∈ (max[0, α(β)],ᾱ) there exists a σ, defined by equation (5), such that parties are indifferent between selecting an extremist and selecting a moderate which they advertise only to their closer group. Suppose party R follows this strategy s * R . We consider the possible deviations of party L.
Deviation 1: consider the following strategy s L : party L selects a moderate and advertises to group r only. In order to derive π L (s L , s * R |m, e), note that a fraction β of group-l voters believe that t L = e and, with probability σ, that t R = e, while the remaining fraction of group-l voters believe that t L = m and t R = e. Hence, i l,in = 1/2 − m(1 − σ)/4 and i l,out = 1/2 + m/4. All group-r voters believe that t L = m and t R = e, so that i r,in = i r,out = 1/2 + m/4. It follows that π L (s L , s * R |m, e) = Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + (m/4) (1 − β(1 − σ)) / (1 + β)) < π L (s * |m, e) = Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + (m/4) (1 − β(1 − σ))).
Next, we derive π L (s L , s * R |m, m). In this case, a fraction β of group-l voters believe that t L = e and, with probability σ, that t R = e. The remaining fraction of group-l voters believe that t L = t R = m. Hence i l,in = 1/2 − m(1 − σ)/4 and i l,out = 1/2. All group-r voters believe that t L = t R = m and therefore i r,in = i r,out = 1/2. It is now easy to check that π L (s L , s * R |m, m) ≤ 1/2 = π L (s * |m, m). Putting together these two facts, it follows that deviation 1 is not profitable.
Deviation 2: consider the following strategy s L : party L selects a moderate and advertises to both groups. We first derive π L (s L , s * R |m, e). A fraction β of group-l voters believe that t L = m and, with probability σ, that t R = e. The remaining fraction believe that t L = m and t R = e. Hence, i l,in = 1/2 + mσ/4 and i l,out = 1/2 + m/4. All group-r voters believe that t L = m and t R = e; therefore i r,in = i r,out = 1/2 + m/4.
It is now easy to check that π L (s L , s * R |m, e) = Pr(µ ≤ 1/2 + (m/4) (1 + βσ) / (1 + β)), which is now bigger than π L (s * |m, e). We now derive π L (s L , s * R |m, m). A fraction β of group-l voters believe that t L = m and, with probability σ, that t R = e. The remaining fraction believe that t L = t R = m. Hence, i l,in = 1/2 + mσ/4 and i l,out = 1/2. All group-r voters believe that t L = t R = m and therefore i r,in = i r,out = 1/2. It follows that π L (s L , s * R |m, m) = 1/2 = π L (s * |m, m). Using these two facts we have that deviation 2 is not profitable if and only if
Given that the right hand side of the above inequality, which is a function of α, vanishes as α approachesᾱ, there exists α * ∈ (max[0, α(β)],ᾱ) such that the inequality holds if α > α * .
